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INTRODUCTION
As illustrated by the worldwide public mistrust of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) negotiations, lawmaking processes that lack transparency and
provide little opportunity for public participation undermine the
legitimacy of the resulting policies. In contrast, as David Levine points
out,' when lawmaking processes invite broad public participation,
problems can be identified and remedied before flawed legislation is
enacted.
Such "black box" policymaking can be equally problematic when
* Permission is hereby granted for noncommercial reproduction of this Article in whole or in part
for education or research purposes, including the making of multiple copies for classroom use,
subject only to the condition that the name of the author, a complete citation, and this copyright
notice and grant of permission be included in all copies.
* IGT Professor of Intellectual Property Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas. The author would like to thank Professors David S. Levine, Annemarie
Bridy, and all of the organizers of, and participants in, the symposium on Examining and
Overcoming Enforcement Issues in Copyright Law, held at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law on March 28, 2012. The author also thanks Jean Sternlight and Lisa Blomgren Bingham for
sharing their expertise on alternative dispute resolution. 0 2012 Mary LaFrance.
I David S. Levine, Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security and the Creation of
International Intellectual Property Law, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 105 (2012).
165
HeinOnline  -- 30 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 165 2012
CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT
it occurs outside the government process. This Article explores the
problems created by the lack of transparency in enforcement
mechanisms adopted by the Center for Copyright Information (CCI),
the consortium formed by major record companies, film studios, and
broadband service providers (ISPs) under the July 2011 Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) in which they collectively agreed to
implement a voluntary "graduated response" approach to certain types
of online copyright infringement. 2  The existence of this private
agreement will be invisible to many consumers who are subject to its
rules, and will generally become apparent only to those who run afoul
of those rules. While the Copyright Alert program implemented under
the MOU claims to have an educational purpose, the fact that the
process, and the rules which govern it, will be largely hidden from view
contradicts that stated purpose. By joining the MOU, signatory ISPs are
protecting themselves against competition from the other signatory ISPs
that might otherwise have adopted enforcement measures and dispute
resolution methods that are fairer to consumers. This private agreement
among businesses affects ISP customers without giving them
meaningful input, and constrains their ability to opt out by choosing
different providers.
While content owners and ISPs outside the MOU can implement
the detection methods and mitigation measures contained therein (or
other measures of their choosing), the collusive nature of the MOU
gives rise to a distinct set of concerns. By compelling multiple ISPs to
conform to a standard of service, thus limiting the opportunities of
consumers to choose ISPs that offer a different standard of service, the
MOU constitutes a type of hidden lawmaking that deserves appropriate
scrutiny.
According to the MOU, the goals of this enforcement program
include "providing education, privacy protection, fair warning, and an
opportunity for review that protects the lawful interests of consumers."3
However, both the Copyright Alert program and the Independent
Review process, as described in the MOU, fall short of achieving these
goals.4 This Article suggests several modifications that would increase
2 At first, the CCI announced that it would implement the Copyright Alert program by July 2012.
Parker Higgins, Graduated Response Deal Steamrollers On Towards July 1 Launch,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Mar. 21, 2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/03/graduated-response-deal-steamrollers-towards-july-1-
launch. Shortly thereafter, however, the CCI's newly appointed executive director, Jill Lesser,
acknowledged that implementation could take another six months. Sarah Lai Stirland, The
Center for Copyright Information's New Chief Jill Lesser on Top ISPs' New 'Copyright Alert'
System, TECHPRESIDENT (Apr. 5, 2012), http://techpresident.com/news/22016/interview-center-
copyright-informations-new-chief-jill-lesser.
3 Memorandum of Understanding, CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT INFORMATION 2 (July 6, 2011),
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/sites/default/files/Momorandun%20of/ 2OUnderstanding.p
df (sic) [hereinafter MOU].
4 In 2010, Professor Annemarie Bridy suggested certain fundamental principles that should be
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the transparency and educational value of the CCI's enforcement and
review process, making it more valuable to users, broadband providers,
and copyright owners.
While there may be no legal requirement for transparency or
public participation in the activities of the CCI, the lack thereof will
needlessly undermine the legitimacy of those activities and bring about
the same kind of public distrust that has afflicted the ACTA and TPP
negotiations. This may cause consumers to resist the CCI's public
education efforts, and perversely, to become less respectful of copyright
laws. As this Article will show, much of the CCI's secrecy is
unnecessary, and can be remedied with some changes to the
consortium's method of operation.
I. A "BLACK Box" INDUSTRY COMPACT
The CCI consortium has lacked transparency at its formation stage,
and this affliction threatens to grow worse as the consortium
implements its key activities-the Copyright Alert program and the
Independent Review program.
A. Formation of the Compact
The CCI was created when the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA), the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA), and a group of major film studios and record companies
(collectively, the "content owners")5 forged an agreement with five of
the largest broadband providers to create a new system of extrajudicial
copyright enforcement. In the July 6, 2011 MOU creating this
consortium, 6 the parties agreed to cooperate in implementing a program
called the "Copyright Alert" system. Under the Copyright Alert system,
ISPs issue individualized warnings to residential wired ISP customers
incorporated in any graduated response system adopted by an ISP. See Annemarie Bridy,
Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR.
L. REV. 81, 126-32 (2010). To its credit, the MOU incorporates several of these principles (e.g.,
graduated sanctions, an opportunity to appeal). While these are necessary elements of a
graduated response system, that does not mean they are sufficient.
5 The participating film studios are: Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures, Paramount Pictures
Corp., Sony Pictures Entertainment, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., Universal City Studios,
and Warner Bros. Entertainment. The participating record companies are: UMG Recordings,
Warner Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and EMI Music North America. MOU, supra
note 3, at 2-3.
6 Considering that one of the stated purposes of the CCI and the Copyright Alert system is to
educate consumers, it is surprising that, as this Article goes to press, there is no link to the MOU
on the CCI website, www.copyrightinformation.org, even though the MOU is hosted there. See
supra note 3. However, copies are available at several websites variously devoted to technology,
privacy, and information access. See, e.g., Center for Copyright Information ISP Copyright Alert
System Memorandum of Understanding, PUBLIC INTELLIGENCE (July 8, 2011),
http://publicintelligence.net/center-for-copyright-information-isp-copyright-alert-system-
memorandum-of-understanding.
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suspected of P2P copyright infringement,7 culminating in "mitigation
measures" that impede the Internet access of the suspected infringers.
Notably, the Copyright Alert system applies only to P2P file-sharing by
residential users; it does not apply to any other acts of alleged online
copyright infringement, and most businesses are completely exempt.
Thus, businesses will not suffer from the same disruptions or
degradations of service as individual consumers who are subject to the
mitigation measures.
The participating ISPs are AT&T, Cablevision, Comcast, Time
Warner Cable, and Verizon. 8 Thus, the consortium includes most of the
major broadband providers-with the notable exception of Cox
Communications. Ironically, Cox is one of the few ISPs that has gone
on record as actually terminating repeat infringers (after multiple
warnings). 9 Its decision not to participate in the consortium could
reflect any of several motivations. Cox may be unwilling to abide by
the restrictions of the MOU, may prefer to maintain flexibility to adapt
its enforcement regime to changes in technology, market pressures, and
evolving interpretations of the law,' 0 or may have concerns about the
cost of the Copyright Alert system and the attendant review process.
Cox's nonparticipation in the CCI does not imply that it will be any
more or less aggressive in discouraging online infringement than its
participating counterparts. Nor does it foreclose Cox from joining the
consortium at a later date.
Because the negotiation of the MOU was not publicized, there was
no public input at the formation stage. Legally, none was required, as in
the case of traditional bilateral trade agreements. As Professor Levine
has pointed out, the ostensible reason for the nonpublic nature of the
multilateral ACTA and TPP negotiations has been the sensitivity
attached to the bargaining positions of the various nations. No such
concerns attach to the formation of the MOU, which is a private
compact among businesses that will have a direct effect on consumers.
However, as Annemarie Bridy has noted, cooperative relationships
between copyright owners and ISPs mean that, even without a
legislative mandate, "graduated response can effectively become the
law for Internet users without ever becoming the law of the land.", 1
7 MOU, supra note 3, at 2.
8 Milton Mueller, Andreas Kuehn, Stephanie Michelle Santoso & Sch. of Info. Studies, Syracuse
Univ., Policing the Network: Using DIP for Copyright Enforcement, SYRACUSE UNIV. 21 (2012),
http://dpi.ischool.syr.edu/Papers files/MM-AK-SS-CSIEL.pdf.
9 Karl Bode, Cox Responds to DMCA "Three Strikes" Report, DSLREPORTS (Oct. 2, 2008),
http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/98149; Annemarie Bridy, ACTA and the Specter of
Graduated Response, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 559, 562 (2011).
10 For example, the Second Circuit's recent decision in Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No.
10-3270-cv, 2012 WL 1130851 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 2012) is but one in a line of cases interpreting
the scope of ISP liability for copyright infringement by users and the scope of the relevant safe
harbors under 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
11 Bridy, supra note 9, at 570-71.
168 [Vol. 30:165
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Like ACTA and TPP, the MOU has support from the Obama
Administration. 12 In contrast to those multilateral trade agreements,
however, the Administration's support of the MOU is not unreserved."
B. Governance
The CCI is governed by a six-person Executive Committee
selected by the signatories (three selected by the RIAA and MPAA, and
three by the participating ISPs, all serving two-year terms without
compensation).14 The Executive Committee employs an Executive
Director.'I
The MOU also calls for a three-member Advisory Board, with one
member selected by the RIAA and MPAA, one member by the
participating ISPs, and the third selected by the other two members. 16
Each member should be "drawn from relevant subject matter expert and
consumer interest communities."17 The members can be employees or
agents of the RIAA, MPAA or the participating ISPs, if the signatories
agree to this in writing.'8 The Advisory Board is to be consulted on
"any significant issues the Executive Committee is considering relating
to the design and implementation of the Notice Process and the
Copyright Alert program." 9 It thus appears that the role and influence
of the Advisory Board will essentially be determined by the CCI, which
will decide whether and when an issue is "significant" enough to
warrant consultation. The MOU does not mandate any regular reporting
or other flow of information to the Advisory Board, nor does it require
12 Victoria Espinel, the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, says of the MOU:
The Administration is committed to reducing infringement of American intellectual
property as part of our ongoing commitment to support jobs, increase exports and
maintain our global competitiveness.
The joining of Internet service providers and entertainment companies in a
cooperative effort to combat online infringement can further this goal and we
commend them for reaching this agreement. We believe it will have a significant
impact on reducing online piracy.
Victoria Espinel, Working Together to Stop Internet Piracy, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 7, 2011,
12:15 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/07/07/working-together-stop-internet-piracy.
This kind of "state-promoted private ordering," Professor Bridy notes, "represents a species of
policymaking that is insulated from public scrutiny." Bridy, supra note 9, at 577.
13 Espinel's statement includes this cautionary note on the MOU: "Our expectation is that the
new organization created by it will have ongoing consultations with privacy and freedom of
expression advocacy groups to assure that its practices are fully consistent with the democratic
values that have helped the Internet to flourish." Id.
14 MOU, supra note 3, at 3.
15 MOU, supra note 3, at 3. The first Executive Director is Jill Lesser, a lobbyist with a
background in Internet issues, who also serves on the Board of the Center for Democracy and
Technology. See Greg Sandoval, Hollywood Formally Brings ISPs into the Anti-Piracy Fight,
CNET NEWS (Apr. 2, 2012, 11:40 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-57408208-
261/hollywood-formally-brings-isps-into-the-anti-piracy-fight; see also Jill Lesser, CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH., https://www.cdt.org/personnel/jill-lesser (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
16 MOU, supra note 3, at 3.
17 Id. at 4.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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the CCI to comply with any request for information from the Advisory
Board. The Advisory Board apparently has no affirmative right to
participate, or to be consulted, in the CCI's decisions, such as the
selection of experts to evaluate the copyright owners' detection
technologies. 20 The MOU does not specify the term of service for
Advisory Board members, nor does it indicate the circumstances under
which members may be removed, or how replacements will be selected
in the event of a vacancy.
The MOU does not expressly require that the membership of the
Advisory Board reflect diverse or unbiased perspectives, or possess an
appropriately broad range of expertise, credentials, or experience.
Whether the Board will conform to such ideals will depend largely on
whether the content owner representatives and the ISPs have
sufficiently adverse interests to guarantee a diversity of viewpoints.
The initial Board does seem to reflect such diversity. On April 2,
2012, the consortium released the names of its first Advisory Board.21
Oddly, notwithstanding the MOU's mandate of three members, four
names were announced. 22 These were: Jerry Berman, chairman of the
Internet Education Foundation23 and founder of the Center for
Democracy and Technology; 24 Marsali Hancock, president of
iKeepSafe.org; 25 Jules Potensky, director of the Future of Privacy
Forum; 26 and Gigi Sohn, president and CEO of Public Knowledge, 27
who has stated her intent to use her position "to be an advocate for the
rights of Internet users and to provide transparency." 28 These choices
seem clearly aimed at reassuring consumers that the Copyright Alert
system will be responsive to their concerns about privacy and Internet
freedom in order to forestall a wave of protest comparable to the one
that derailed the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act
20 See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text
21 Sandoval, supra note 15.
22 Id. No reason has been given for expanding the Advisory Board. Nor has the manner in which
the fourth member was selected been disclosed.
23 The Internet Education Foundation is a nonprofit organization dedicated to educating the
public and policymakers on Internet-related issues. See INTERNET EDUC. FOUND.,
http://www.neted.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
24 The Center for Democracy and Technology is a nonprofit organization devoted to freedom,
privacy, and security on the Internet. See CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.,
https://www.cdt.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
25 iKeepSafe.org is the Internet Keep Safe Organization, a nonprofit organization devoted to
Internet safety, with a focus on children. See IKEEPSAFE, http://www.ikeepsafe.org (last visited
Apr. 9,2012).
26 The Future of Privacy Forum is an organization focused on data privacy. See FUTURE OF
PRIVACY FORUM, http://www.futureofprivacy.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
27 According to its mission statement, Public Knowledge "preserves the openness of the Internet
and the public's access to knowledge, promotes creativity through balanced copyright, and
upholds and protects the rights of consumers to use innovative technology lawfully." PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE, http://www.publicknowledge.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
28 Sandoval, supra note 15.
170 [Vol. 30:165
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(PIPA), and which threatens ACTA and TPP.29 Their selection also
seems responsive to Professor Levine's call to "bring in the nerds." 30
However, because the MOU does not guarantee the Advisory
Board a significant role in the consortium's major decisions, there is no
assurance that their expertise or diverse perspectives will have a direct
impact on the CCI's activities. While they can certainly engage in
public criticism of those activities, the Advisory Board members could
engage in that same public criticism even if they were not serving on the
Board. Without a more well-defined role in the CCI, the Board
members may not have sufficient access to "inside" information to
influence the direction of the CCI. Suggestions for expanding their role
are noted later in this Article.
II. ACTIVITIES OF THE COMPACT
The lack of consumer participation in the CCI is not limited to
formation and governance. It appears that most of the CCI's activities
will be closed to public scrutiny. While this may already be true of the
activities of individual ISPs, which are free to develop their own
policies (which may include termination of service) for dealing with
subscribers who engage in repeat infringements, in the absence of an
industry compact an individual consumer that is dissatisfied with the
manner in which his or her ISP responds to suspected infringement may
(depending on the geographic market) have the opportunity to choose a
different provider. Because the MOU requires five of the six major
providers to conform to certain standardized responses to infringement
accusations, however, relatively few consumers will have the
opportunity to choose an ISP that employs a different standard.
As discussed below, transparency is lacking in both the Copyright
Alert program, which identifies and sends notices to accused infringers,
and the Independent Review program, which provides a very limited
opportunity for subscribers to avoid service disruptions by proving that
they are falsely accused.
While the CCI relies on experts and neutrals to guarantee the
fairness and effectiveness of its activities, as discussed below, the
system should provide stronger assurances that the advice of experts
will be implemented, and that the experts and neutrals will be unbiased.
A. Copyright Alert Program
The MOU signatories commit to implementing systems designed
to detect P2P file-sharing. 31 Specifically, the RIAA and the MPAA will
29 Sandoval, supra note 15.
30 Levine, supra note 1.
31 MOU, supra note 3, at 4.
1712012]1
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develop methodologies "for identifying instances of P2P online
infringement that are designed to detect and provide evidence that the
identified content was uploaded or downloaded or copied and offered
on a P2P network to be downloaded through a bit torrent or other P2P
technology." 32 The ISPs agree to match the IP addresses identified by
the RIAA and MPAA to the ISP's subscriber accounts, to keep a record
of alleged repeat infringers, and to apply the "mitigation measures"
described in the MOU. 33
The MOU does not describe how these methodologies might work,
nor does it impose any constraints on the methodologies. It
acknowledges that they will change over time.34 Nor does the MOU
require the signatories to disclose to ISP subscribers the existence or
nature of the detection technologies to which their computers and
networks will be exposed. Thus, consumers will be unable to assess
whether, and to what extent, any of the technologies might invade the
privacy of subscribers, make them vulnerable to security breaches, or
otherwise impair the quality of the broadband service they receive.
Public disclosure of these methodologies, of course, would
compromise their effectiveness. A suitable proxy for such public
disclosures, however, would be to subject the methodologies to
inspection by a neutral expert. The MOU recognizes the importance of
expert advice, but provides insufficient guarantees that the expert will
be competent and neutral, or that the expert's recommendations will be
effectuated.
The MOU requires disclosure of the detection technologies only to
the CCI's own "independent and impartial technical expert or experts"
(the "Independent Expert") who will review the technologies
periodically.35 The MOU does not give the Advisory Board any role in
the selection of this expert; he or she will be selected and compensated
by a simple majority of the Executive Committee with no consumer
input.36 Thus, based on the makeup of the Executive Committee and the
majority rule, the expert could be selected by the three copyright owner
representatives and only one of the three ISP representatives.
Although the Independent Expert will consult with "recognized
privacy experts," they too will be selected by a simple majority of the
Executive Committee, with no requirement of consumer or Advisory
Board input. 37 Although the expert is charged with identifying privacy
issues and recommending enhancements to address those issues,
signatories are expressly not required to adopt those
32 Id.
33 Id. at 5.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id
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recommendations. 38  While the expert is required to disclose the
recommendations to the RIAA and MPAA, and to the specific ISP
affected, the expert is prohibited from disclosing them to anyone else,
including the other signatory ISPs, without the consent of the RIAA, the
MPAA, and the affected ISP. 39 There is no provision allowing this
information to be disclosed to the affected subscribers. The expert is
required to maintain the confidentiality of any proprietary information
supplied in the course of this review; even as between the signatories,
only "general descriptions" of the detection technologies need to be
exchanged, and only upon request.40
Using their detection technologies, the RIAA and MPAA will
notify ISPs when they detect P2P infringement activity. The ISPs agree
to send a series of escalating warning notices, known as "Copyright
Alerts," to the subscribers involved.41 Each ISP agrees that, after the
specified series of warnings, it will take "mitigation measures" against
the subscriber, which may include reduction of transmission speeds,
restriction of Internet access, or redirection to a landing page that may
contain information about copyright infringement; significant discretion
is vested in the ISP.42 The MOU does not require termination of
service, or even temporary suspension, but neither does it preclude these
sanctions. 43 The ISPs will, on a monthly basis, send the RIAA and
MPAA data about subscribers who receive these Alerts, and copyright
owners can use this data as a basis for seeking disclosure of the
subscribers' identities through the judicial process. 44
There is a high risk that these detection technologies will lead to
false positives.4s To address concerns over the accuracy of detection
technologies, the RIAA and MPAA agree to send notices of alleged P2P
online infringement to ISPs only if the methodology used to detect
infringements has been reviewed by the Independent Expert and found
not to be "fundamentally unreliable" 46-a minimalist-sounding,
undefined standard.47 If a detection methodology is so flawed that the
expert labels it fundamentally unreliable, then the expert is required to
notify the signatory using that technology (the RIAA or MPAA) of this
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 6-12.
42 Id. at 10-12.
43 Executive Director Jill Lesser has stated that she does not anticipate that terminations will be
among the mitigation measures. Stirland, supra note 2. Advisory Board member Gigi Sohn has
stated that she will ask the participating ISPs to agree that mitigation measures will not include
suspension of service. Sandoval, supra note 15.
44 MOU, supra note 3, at 14-15.
45 Bridy, supra note 4, at 126-27.
46 MOU, supra note 3, at 5-6.
47 Id. at 5.
1732012]
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deficiency, but only on a confidential basis.48  Thus, no other
signatory-including the ISPs who are receiving the notices-will
know that the methodology is fundamentally unreliable. Nor,
apparently, will this unreliability be disclosed to the Executive
Committee, the Advisory Board, or the neutral arbitrator that
subsequently hears the subscriber's appeal. While the MPAA and
RIAA agree not to send ISPs notices of P2P infringement based on such
fundamentally unreliable detection methods, the MOU apparently relies
on the honor system to enforce this agreement, since no one other than
the Independent Expert and the RIAA or MPAA (as applicable) will
know that the detection method is fundamentally unreliable. The MOU
thus contains no enforcement mechanism for ensuring that the MPAA
and RIAA will use reliable technologies.
In generating infringement notices, the RIAA and MPAA agree to
"focus on" copying that involves files "consisting primarily of
infringing material" or which contain "substantially complete" copies of
copyrighted works, and to disregard file-sharing activities in which a de
minimis amount of infringing material is included in a "file consisting
primarily of non-infringing material." 49 Apparently it is left to the
judgment of the copyright owner representatives to determine where to
draw these lines. It is entirely possible that a work qualifying as fair
use, such as a parody, satire, mash-up, or commentary, would trigger a
Copyright Alert, since a large portion of such a work might consist of
copyrighted material.
Many of the details of the Copyright Alert program could be
implemented independently by ISPs and content owners, and already
have been; online infringement detection technologies are already in
use, and consumers do not have access to the details of these
technologies. The MOU does not require complete uniformity in
approach, and individual ISPs still have some range of choice,
especially with regard to mitigation measures. But the MOU does
narrow their range of choice. As discussed below, consumers will feel
the consequences of this narrowed range of choices when they must
choose between service disruptions and a potentially biased dispute
resolution process.
B. Independent Review
The non-transparency and potential bias inherent in the Copyright
Alert program is especially evident, and potentially of greatest concern,
in the so-called Independent Review process. As discussed below,
however, these flaws can be addressed by making some adjustments to
48 Id. at 5.
49 Id. at 6.
174 [Vol. 30:165
HeinOnline  -- 30 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 174 2012
PIERCING THE BLACK BOX
the review process. If the consortium does not make these adjustments,
ISPs that impose mitigation measures may be perceived as biased and
unresponsive to legitimate consumer concerns.
A crucial component of the Copyright Alert program, Independent
Review provides an avenue for ISP subscribers to dispute allegations of
copyright infringement on an anonymous basis,50 and thereby to obtain
relief from mitigation measures. If a subscriber receives a Copyright
Alert that threatens such measures, the subscriber can initiate an appeal
for a set fee (currently $35, but refundable if the user prevails).' This
triggers a nonjudicial review to determine whether the accusation of
infringement was accurate. Subject to the substantive and procedural
rules outlined in the MOU, the review will be entrusted to an
administering organization selected by the Executive Committee. 52
The MOU purports to prohibit both the complaining copyright
owner and the subscriber from introducing the outcome of the review
process as evidence in a judicial proceeding. 53  However, since
subscribers are not signatories to the MOU, they cannot be bound by
this provision unless they are required to agree to it as a condition of
invoking the review or in their user agreement with the ISP.5 4 Of
course, if the prohibition is buried in a click-through agreement then the
subscriber will probably be completely unaware of it.
When examined through the lens of transparency and fairness, the
Independent Review process comes up short in several respects: (1)
limited defenses; (2) the role of experts; (3) reliance on unwritten,
unpublished decisions; and (4) the potential for "captive" neutrals.
Each of these concerns is discussed below.
1. Limited Defenses
The grounds on which a subscriber may invoke the review process
are strictly limited:
(1) The subscriber's account was misidentified;
(2) The subscriber's account was used without the subscriber's
knowledge or consent by someone outside of the subscriber's
household, and the subscriber could not reasonably have
prevented it;
50 Anonymity does not apply, however, to defenses that disclose the subscriber's identity. Id. at
14.
51 Id at 14, 30.
52 Id. at 33. The administering organization is discussed in the text accompanying notes 85-91,
infra.
53 MOU, supra note 3, at 14.
54 While the MOU requires signatory ISPs to notify their subscribers, in their user agreements,
that receipt of multiple Copyright Alerts may lead to mitigation measures, it does not obligate the
ISPs to include the details of the Independent Review process in those agreements. Id. at 7.
2012] 175
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(3) The subscriber's use of the work was authorized by the
copyright owner;
(4) The subscriber's reproduction and distribution of the work over
a P2P network was fair use;
(5) The file was misidentified as consisting primarily of the
copyrighted material;
(6) The work was published before 1923 (and thus its copyright had
expired).55
As a threshold matter, two of these grounds for appeal-(l)
subscriber misidentification and (5) file misidentification-assume that
either the subscriber or the reviewer knows whether or not the copyright
owner's detection methodology is "fundamentally unreliable." The
Independent Review standards provide that the detection technology
"shall have a rebuttable presumption that it works in accordance with its
specifications;" however, this presumption will not apply if the
Independent Expert's review of that technology previously found it to
be fundamentally unreliable.56 Unfortunately, the MOU does not
provide any mechanism for the arbitrator or the subscriber to determine
whether the technology was found to be fundamentally unreliable, since
the MOU requires the Independent Expert to communicate this finding
only to the copyright owner, on a confidential basis.57 Nor do the
Independent Review procedures, as currently outlined in the MOU,
require the copyright owner to disclose this information in the course of
the review. The MOU contemplates that, going forward, the rules for
information disclosure in the context of Independent Review will be
further developed; it also gives the reviewer discretion to request
supplementary information that he or she deems to be material.58
Nonetheless, at this time nothing in the Independent Review process
compels the copyright owner to reveal that its technology was found to
be fundamentally unreliable. This significant oversight should be
remedied before the Independent Review process is implemented, as it
undermines the legitimacy of the entire review process.
Beyond this threshold matter, the listed grounds for review do not
even come close to encompassing the range of lawful uses for P2P file-
sharing, even if the field is limited to plausible lawful uses of
commercially distributed sound recordings and audiovisual works.
Among the notable omissions are the following:
55 MOU, supra note 3, at 26-28.
56 Id. at 27-28.
57 Id. at 5.
58 Id. at 32.
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(1) Works that are in the public domain, although published in 1923
or later, consisting of
a. Non-renewed copyrights;59
b. Copyrights forfeited due to publication without
notice; 60
c. Works of foreign origin that are not protected by U.S.
copyright law;61
d. Sound recordings fixed in the United States prior to
February 15, 1972;62
(2) Fair use as applied to P2P downloads and creation and
distribution of derivative works (because the fair use defense
listed in the MOU refers specifically to the act of
"reproducing ... and distributing" a work over a P2P
network);63
(3) Authorization by a licensee (as distinguished from a copyright
"owner");64
(4) Oral or implied license (because the MOU requires that
"authorization" be evidenced in writing or "other documented
evidence"); 65
(5) Non-copyrightable subject matter;66
(6) Defective copyright title;67
59 Until 1992, when renewal became automatic, works published before 1978 entered the public
domain if not timely renewed. Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106
Stat. 264 (1992) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2006)). Some well-known motion
pictures lost their copyrights in this way. See, e.g., Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1125 (9th
Cir. 1979) (demonstrating that the copyright in the 1938 film "Pygmalion" expired in 1966 due
to nonrenewal). Even if the underlying literary works are still protected by copyright, those
underlying copyrights are typically not owned by the film studios, which would therefore have no
standing to enforce them. See, e.g., id. at 1124 (noting that studio was mere licensee); see also 17
U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006) (only the owner of an exclusive right has standing to sue).
60 Such forfeitures were possible until March 1, 1989. 17 U.S.C. § 405 (2006).
61 Published works from some foreign countries are not protected by United States copyright law.
17 U.S.C. § 104 (2006). Certain other foreign works may have entered the public domain in both
their countries of origin and the United States. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006).
62 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2006). Some of these recordings may be protected by state copyright
laws, but these vary in scope and duration. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos, Inc., 4
N.Y.3d 540 (2005). More importantly, however, the MOU implies that the Copyright Alert
program applies only to infringement offederal copyrights. MOU, supra note 3, at I (referring to
infringement "under Title 17" in the preamble).
63 MOU, supra note 3, at 26 (emphasis added).
64 While an exclusive licensee may be considered a copyright owner for certain purposes, a
nonexclusive licensee is not. See Hyperquest, Inc. v. N'Site Solutions, Inc., 632 F.3d 377 (7th
Cir. 2011).
65 MOU, supra note 3, at 27-28.
66 For example, a derivative work that is itself infringing may be ineligible for copyright
protection. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). Some songwriters, for example, have unconsciously
copied from existing musical works. E.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722
F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983). A motion picture may infringe a screenplay, treatment, play, or other
underlying source material. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390
(1940).
67 Mistakes or uncertainty as to copyright title are not uncommon. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207 (1990) (concerning dispute over ownership of renewal copyright); Fleischer
Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A, Inc., 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011) (concerning dispute over chain of
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The MOU does not explain why all of these defenses are
excluded.68 Some of them involve largely factual determinations, such
as public domain status or defects in copyright title. These factual
questions are just as amenable to resolution through nonjudicial review
as the question whether a work was published before 1923.69 They are
also more likely to arise in the P2P context, since the CCI's copyright
owners are unlikely to bring infringement complaints against
subscribers who share copies of pre-1923 films such as The Birth of a
Nation (1915) or Charlie Chaplin's The Kid (1921). Indeed, the defense
of pre-1923 publication seems so unlikely to arise under the Copyright
Alert program that its inclusion in the MOU, in light of the exclusion of
the other public domain defenses, seems ludicrous. It is true that some
of the other omitted defenses, such as fair use downloading, fair use
distribution of derivative works, or implied license, are less objective
than public domain status or defects in title, and thus arguably might be
more difficult to resolve through a nonjudicial process. However, the
MOU already permits consideration of fair use in "reproducing ... and
distributing" a work. If the Independent Review process is capable of
assessing the nuances of a fair use defense in this context, it should be
capable of assessing the other defenses that call for a similar degree of
judgment.
The defense of unauthorized use of the subscriber's account is also
problematic. Each subscriber is permitted to invoke this defense only
once, unless he or she can demonstrate that a subsequent unauthorized
use occurred "despite reasonable attempts to secure the Internet
account."70 Given the widely varying degrees of technological literacy
among Internet users, a substantial number of ISP subscribers may lack
the knowledge or skills necessary to secure their wireless routers against
unauthorized users. The current version of the MOU does not indicate
that signatory ISPs will provide any kind of technical assistance to
subscribers who need to secure their accounts. Offering such
assistance, however, would further the CCI's stated goals of educating
title in "Betty Boop" cartoons).
68 One might conceivably add copyright misuse to this list of defenses. Under this doctrine,
certain kinds of anticompetitive conduct by a copyright owner can make the copyright
unenforceable until the anticompetitive conduct ceases. See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard
Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010). However, there would seem to be few occasions
where a legitimate defense of copyright misuse would arise in the context of P2P file sharing, and
the complexity and uncertain scope of such a defense would make it difficult to resolve through
arbitration.
69 Even the determination of when a work is "published" can be a close question. See Robert
Brauneis, Copyright and the World's Most Popular Song, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 335,
378 (2009) (explaining that the uncertainty over the publication date of "Happy Birthday" affects
its current copyright status); Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 (11th
Cir. 1999) (questioning whether the "I Have a Dream" speech was publicly distributed in 1963).
70 MOU, supra note 3, at 27.
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consumers and reducing the incidence of unauthorized file sharing, and
would avoid penalizing subscribers for a simple lack of technical
expertise.
2. Role of Experts
Just as experts are utilized in evaluating the copyright owners'
infringement detection technologies, experts also play a significant role
in the Independent Review process. The MOU calls for the
administering organization selected by the consortium to hire "an
accepted, independent expert on copyright law" to prepare an outline of
fair use principles "and any other legal principles necessary for
resolution of issues within the scope of th[e] Independent Review
process."71 The copyright expert must be approved by the Executive
Committee, although the MOU does not specify whether this approval
requires a majority vote.72 The expert's outline is important because it
will provide the substantive rules that will govern the Independent
Review. 73  Additional experts may be retained by the Executive
Committee "[i]f additional material question[s] of law arise." 74 No
standards are articulated for determining whether a particular individual
qualifies as a copyright expert, or as an expert on any other questions of
law. Nor does it appear that the Advisory Board must be consulted in
the selection process. The copyright owner and ISP representatives on
the Executive Committee may not have sufficiently adverse interests to
guarantee an unbiased selection.
While the signatories to the MOU are invited to provide input to
these experts, there is no indication that the Advisory Board, despite its
consumer orientation and its relevant expertise, will be invited to
participate in this process.75 There is no requirement that the expert's
outline of legal principles be made public, or even shared with a
subscriber who invokes the review process. Nor does the MOU indicate
whether the Executive Committee can reject one expert's work product
and retain a different expert if they are dissatisfied. If one goal of the
Copyright Alert program is consumer education, then the expert's legal
perspectives should be made public. If not, subscribers will have no
way to ascertain whether the expert's presentation of the law is accurate
and unbiased, and whether it has been updated recently enough to
reflect the latest judicial interpretations. If the legal guidance supplied
to the reviewer is flawed, then even the most neutral of reviewers may
render a flawed decision. Therefore, the expert's outline of legal
71 MOU, supra note 3, at 35.
72 Id
73 Id. at3 3-35.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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principles should be posted prominently on the CCI website.
3. Black Box Independent Reviews
While the Independent Review process raises several concerns,
perhaps the most significant one is that the decisions will be unwritten,
unpublished, and unaccompanied by detailed explanations. The MOU
expressly states that, for the most part, "[r]eviewers shall not prepare
written decisions in the cases they decide." 76 Even for the subscriber
requesting the review, the decision will communicate only the outcome
and "a short description of the rationale;" the description of the rationale
can be omitted entirely if the decision is favorable to the user.n
This is in sharp contrast to the default rules applied by most
arbitration organizations, including the American Arbitration
Association (AAA). Those rules typically require written explanations,
and permit publication with the consent of both parties.78
One of the stated goals of the Copyright Alert program is
consumer education. 79 Yet the decisions under the Independent Review
process, if unpublished, will have no educational value for any member
of the public other than the subscriber who sought the review. Even for
that subscriber, the absence of a full written explanation undermines the
educational value. Because these decisions will be hidden from view,
76 Id. at 34 (emphasis added). Written records are permitted only "to the extent necessary to
maintain records of outcomes of proceedings for purposes of operation and review of the
Independent Review process." Id.
77 Id. at 33.
78 See, e.g., SwISS RULES OF INT'L ARBITRATION, § IV, art. 32(2)-(3) (requiring written
explanations), § VI, art. 43(3) (allowing publication after identifying material removed, unless a
party objects) (2004), available at
https://www.swissarbitration.org/sa/download/SRLAenglish.pdf; AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N,
NON-BINDING ARBITRATION RULES § 31 (2009), available at
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDFurl=/cs/groups/comrnmercial/documents/document/mdaw/mdal/
~edisp/adrstg_ 01 0623.pdf (requiring a writing "with very brief reasons" unless the parties agree
otherwise, but not addressing publication); AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES art. 27, §§ 1-2 (requiring written explanation), 4 (allowing
publication with parties' consent) (2009), available at
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=/UCM/ADRSTG_002037 (last visited Apr. 18,
2012); AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, AAA EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES art. 39(b)-(c) (2009), available at
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=/UCM/ADRSTG_004362 (last visited Apr. 18,
2012) [hereinafter AAA Employment Arbitration Rules] (requiring written explanation and
publication with names removed); LONDON CT. OF INT'L ARBITRATION, LCIA ARBITRATION
RULES art. 30 (requiring written explanation, and awards confidential unless parties consent to
publication) (1998), available at
http://www.lcia.org/DisputeResolutionServices/LCIAArbitration_Rules.aspx; UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules art. 34(2)-(5) (Dec. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-
e.pdf.
79 MOU, supra note 3, at 1-2. The educational purpose is publicly highlighted at the CCI
website, which describes the Copyright Alert system as "a progressive system aimed at educating
Internet subscribers about digital copyright and the potential consequences of inadvertent or
purposeful copyright violations through peer-to-peer networks." CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT
INFORMATION, http://www.copyrightinformation.org/faq (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
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the public will also have no opportunity to scrutinize them for possible
bias or flawed legal analysis, or to discover whether any copyright
owner has engaged in a pattern of abuse by making multiple unfounded
assertions of infringement.
To provide education and fair warning both to the subscriber who
initiated the review and to the public in general, each review should
produce a detailed written explanation, which should be published after
removing the subscriber's identifying information.80 This is consistent
with the practice in Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP) proceedings, 81 which provide nonjudicial resolution of
cybersquatting disputes under the terms of a private contract (the
domain registration agreement) between ICANN-accredited domain
name registrars and domain name registrants. 82 UDRP provides an
especially useful analogy, because while the UDRP process arises under
a private contract like the MOU, publishing the outcome of UDRP
proceedings serves the important purpose of educating the public on the
scope of permissible use of trademarks in domain names that are subject
to ICANN regulation. It also allows for public evaluation and criticism
of the UDRP process. 83 Since the Independent Review process turns on
the CCI's interpretations of federal law, publishing the decisions
emanating from the reviews would serve similar public purposes. 84
This aspect of the MOU's transparency problem is easy to remedy.
The MOU can be modified to require written explanations, and
publication of those explanations once personal identifying information
is removed. The MOU can require the signatories to consent to these
terms as a condition of their compact, and the consent of subscribers can
be obtained at the time they initiate the Independent Review process.
This should not add significantly to the cost of conducting the reviews,
or introduce undue delays. Failure to take this simple step, however,
may undermine consumer perceptions of the legitimacy of the
80 The feasibility of removing a user's identifying information prior to publication is illustrated
by the Private Letter Ruling practice utilized by the Internal Revenue Service, which balances the
goal of public disclosure against the privacy rights of the taxpayer. See also AAA Employment
Arbitration Rules, supra note 78, art. 39(c) (requiring publication with names removed).
81 Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES &
Nos. (ICANN) § 4(j) (1999), http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm [hereinafter ICANN
UDRP Policy]; Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN § 15(d)
(2009), http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm.
82 ICANN UDRP Policy, supra note 81 (see Notes 2-3).
83 See Michael Geist, Fair.com? An Examination of the Allegations of Systematic Unfairness in
the ICANN UDRP, available at http://aixl/uottawa/ca/- geist/geistudrp.pdf (hereinafter Geist,
Fair.com?); Michael Geist, Fundamentally Fair.com? An Update on Bias Allegations and the
ICANN UDRP, available at http://aixl.uottawa.ca/-geist/fairupdate.pdf (hereinafter Geist,
Fundamentally Fair.com?).
84 See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Private Law, Public "Justice": Another Look at Privacy,
Arbitration, and Global E-Commerce, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 769, 772-73, 785-89
(2000) (urging publication of online arbitration awards that define public rights; also noting that
publication "is a check on arbitral abuse," promotes the appearance of fairness, and helps to level
the playing field for inexperienced disputants).
2012] 181
HeinOnline  -- 30 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 181 2012
182 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT
Independent Review process.
4. The Potential for Biased Neutrals
Just how independent is the Independent Review process itself?
Under the MOU, the selection of neutrals is entrusted to an
"administering organization" designated by the Executive Committee.85
The MOU provides no guidance as to how the administering
organization should be selected, whether it should meet some objective
criteria such as accreditation, affiliation, or track record, how its
performance will be evaluated, or the circumstances under which its
services will be continued or terminated. Thus, on its face, the MOU
provides no assurance that this organization will be competent or
unbiased in conducting reviews. However, in April 2012, the CCI
announced that it had selected the AAA, 86 an established and reputable
dispute resolution organization.87 The selection of the AAA will
contribute to the perception of the Independent Review process as fair,
even if, as discussed below, it cannot guarantee actual fairness in
practice. Of course, the consortium is free to select a different
administering organization in the future, and there is no guarantee that
its future selections will inspire equal confidence.
According to the MOU, each Independent Review will be
conducted by a single reviewer selected by the administering
organization from its panel of neutrals.88 The MOU does not prescribe
a process for selecting the panels or the individual reviewers, does not
define neutrality, does not indicate how neutrality will be ensured, and
provides no standard for evaluating the performance of reviewers; it
leaves these matters entirely up to the administering organization. 89
While the reviewers must be lawyers, they need not be copyright
experts, and they may even be staff employees of the administering
organization. The latter is instructed to "train[]" them in the rules of
copyright law as interpreted by the Executive Committee's own
copyright expert.90 If the copyright guidance provided to the reviewers
is inaccurate, their decisions are likely to be flawed. The fact that each
review is conducted by a single reviewer instead of a three-person
85 MOU, supra note 3, at 33. The MOU does not specify whether this requires a majority vote.
86 Sandoval, supra note 15.
87 Neutrals provided by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) have arbitrated disputes
involving a wide array of legal issues; AAA neutrals served on Copyright Arbitration Royalty
Panels until those panels were superseded by statute in 2004. See The American Arbitration
Association: A Long History of Working with Government, AM. ARB. Ass'N, (Sept. 8, 2011),
available at
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDFjsessionid=kbxxPbvFTQmmP8cycYdvlLjfxmgYV4dLDBNsfj
xlgH347bxlGqLL!-1786312740?doc=ADRSTG_004329; 17 U.S.C. § 802(b) (repealed 2004);
37 C.F.R. § 251 (repealed 2004).
88 MOU, supra note 3, at 31.
89 Id. at 33.
90 Id. at 34.
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panel, although cost-effective and not unprecedented, increases the
opportunity for a biased or misinformed decision.91
The reviewer will also have access to information about any
previous reviews that involved the same subscriber, not only to
determine whether the subscriber has previously invoked the
"unauthorized use" defense, but also for determining general
credibility.92 There is no requirement, however, that the reviewer be
informed of any prior false accusations made by the relevant copyright
owner. Thus, the reviewer will not know if the copyright owner has
engaged in a pattern of unfounded accusations-even though this might
indicate that the copyright owner's detection technology is unreliable,
or that it has strayed from the MOU's invocation to focus on
infringements of entire works.
Dispute resolution experts such as Nancy Welsh have called
attention to the problem of "embedded neutrals"-neutrals who are
associated in some way with one or more of the parties involved in a
dispute. 93  While such neutrals are not necessarily problematic in
disputes between sophisticated parties or parties with shared norms, 94
they can be problematic in other situations. Welsh might as well be
describing the Copyright Alert program when she writes:
[T]he use of embedded neutrals becomes worrisome when the
neutrals' role is due to their special relationship with just one of the
parties, usually the more powerful repeat player, in uneven contests
between that repeat player and a one-time player. This concern is
especially strong when the one-time player is not as sophisticated as
the repeat player, has not voluntarily or knowingly chosen the
dispute resolution forum that will be used to resolve her dispute, and
is either unaware of the special relationship between the neutral and
the repeat player or aware of the relationship but effectively unable
to challenge it.95
Thus, the problem is not limited to situations where the neutral has
a formal relationship with one of the parties. It applies any time one
party is a repeat player, and the other party is a one-time player, because
the repeat player is in a position to give future business to the neutral.96
For example, in Alexander Colvin's study of employer-employee
91 See Geist, Fair.com?, supra note 83, at 18-26; Geist, Fundamentally Fair.com?, supra note
83, at 6, 8.
92 MOU, supra note 4, at 34.
93 Nancy Welsh, What is "(Im)Partial Enough" in a World of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L.
REV. 395 (2010).
94 Id at 398.
95 Id. at 399.
96 See Stephen J. Ware, Domain-Name Arbitration in the Arbitration-Law Context: Consent to,
and Fairness in, the UDRP, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGrNG Bus. L. 129 (2002).
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arbitrations, repeat players (the employers) had an advantage in
arbitrations against one-time players (the employees), and the advantage
increased when the repeat player had used the same arbitrator in the
past.97 Since the RIAA and MPAA will be repeat players under the
CC1's Independent Review process, and the consumer will typically be
a one-time player, this advantage will go against the consumer.
Professor Welsh identifies four process characteristics that
"reliably predict perceptions of fairness" in the arbitration context: "(1)
the opportunity for people to tell their stories ('voice'); (2)
demonstrated consideration of these stories by the decisionmaker
('being heard'); (3) the involvement of a decisionmaker who is trying to
be open-minded and fair; and (4) dignified, respectful treatment." 98
With embedded neutrals, non-repeat players are likely to have "doubts
regarding the likelihood of real consideration from arbitrators who are
open-minded and fair." 99 These doubts may be well founded in some
cases; Professor Welsh recounts the story of Elizabeth Bartholet, whose
services as an arbitrator for consumer credit disputes were no longer
requested by the National Arbitration Forum (an ostensibly neutral
dispute resolution provider) after she ordered a significant award in
favor of a consumer. 00 In the UDRP context, Michael Geist found that
the dispute resolution providers that produced the most favorable
outcomes for complainants received the most repeat business.' 0' In
addition, the providers assigned more cases to individual reviewers
whose track records favored complainants.102
Are the interests of copyright owners and ISPs sufficiently adverse
to assure the neutrality of the Independent Review process? On its face,
the Copyright Alert program is not in the best interests of the ISPs,
because it will assist copyright owners in obtaining the information they
need to hold ISPs secondarily liable for copyright infringement by their
subscribers. 103 This raises the question of why ISPs agreed to the MOU
in the first place. There is speculation that ISPs are motivated by their
desire to play a greater role in the lawful delivery of motion pictures,
television, and sound recordings, and that they accommodated copyright
97 Welsh, supra note 93, at 421 (citing Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on
Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.
405 (2007)).
98 Welsh, supra note 93, at 424.
99 Id.
100 Id at 437-41.
101 Geist, Fair.com?, supra note 83, at 3, 6; Geist, Fundamentally Fair.com?, supra note 83, at 5.
102 Geist, Fair.com?, supra note 83, at 22-26; Geist, Fundamentally Faircom?, supra note 83, at
6-7.
103 An ISP whose subscribers engage in infringing file-sharing is not eligible for safe harbor
protection under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a) (West
2010), unless it has "reasonably implemented" a policy of terminating "repeat infringers." Id. §
512(i)(1)(A). The monthly reporting requirement imposed by the MOU requires ISPs to report
the number of Copyright Alerts which each of its subscribers has received, thus building a record
of repeat infringers. MOU, supra note 3, at 14-15.
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owners in order to secure favorable licensing deals in the future. 104 ISPs
may also fear that their statutory safe harbor protections under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) may be eroded by lobbying
pressure from the copyright industries; they may hope that their
cooperation in the Copyright Alert program will stave off such
pressures. In addition, ISPs may legitimately share the copyright
owners' goal of discouraging P2P file-sharing, because of its high
bandwidth consumption.105 Thus, while in some respects the interests
of copyright owners and ISPs are adverse, in others they are aligned.
Accordingly, the relationship does not seem sufficiently adversarial to
assure the neutrality of the review process.
Several of the flaws in the Independent Review process-limited
defenses, unwritten and unpublished opinions, inadequate protection
against reviewer bias-may reflect, in large part, the desire of the
consortium members to minimize cost and maximize efficiency, and the
fear that introducing more procedural protections would interfere with
these goals. Similar concerns seemingly doomed the European Union's
2011 "Stakeholders' Dialogue on Illegal Up and Downloading." 06
Unlike that attempted agreement, the MOU does not make ISPs directly
responsible for hearing customers' appeals. Nonetheless, the MOU
makes the ISPs responsible for sending Copyright Alerts, implementing
mitigation measures, and providing monthly reports to the copyright
owners (and semi-annual reports to the CCI on a "reasonable efforts"
basis). The ISPs will also bear the brunt of consumer complaints if
these measures involve service disruptions, especially if subscribers
believe they have been falsely accused or received unfair treatment in
the Independent Review. If the recent experience of British ISPs is any
indication, there is likely to be a high incidence of false reporting; when
the British Phonographic Industry (BPI) accused British Telecom (BT)
of ignoring 100,000 cases of illegal P2P file-sharing, BT found that less
than two-thirds of a sample of 21,000 cases were properly matched to
BT customers. 107
As this Article goes to press, the CCI website contains only a
truncated description of the Independent Review process. For example,
104 See Bridy, supra note 9, at 571-72; Richard Koman, RJAA/ISP deal on filesharing suggests
content deals in the offing, ZDNET (Dec. 22, 2008 1:22 PM),
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/government/riaaisp-deal-on-filesharing-suggests-content-deals-in-
the-offing/4234; Nate Anderson, RIAA graduated response plan: Q&A with Cary Sherman, ARS
TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/12/riaa-graduated-response-plan-qa-with-
cary-sherman.ars.
105 Bridy, supra note 9, at 572.
106 Mueller et al., supra note 8, at 11-13 (reporting ISPs' concerns over increased paperwork,
appeals, and customer excuses, and the fear that they would be involved in "thousands of
procedures per day").
107 Statement by BT Spokesman to ISPreview (Sept. 28, 2009),
http://www.ispreview.co.uk/story/2009/09/28/bpi-claims-uk-isp-bt-failed-to-tackle-100000-
illegal-broadband-downloaders.html.
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it does not list the defenses that are available, nor does it reveal that
there will be no written decisions. There is no reason to withhold this
information from the general public. Before the Copyright Alert system
is implemented, the CCI website should be updated to ensure that
consumers are fully aware of what to expect from the review process.
CONCLUSION
The activities of the CCI consortium have already attracted
considerable public attention. That scrutiny will only intensify once the
Copyright Alert program is implemented. Unfortunately, the approach
to detection, enforcement, and dispute resolution outlined in the current
MOU takes shortcuts that undermine the legitimacy and the educational
value of the program. Whether these shortcuts are mere oversights, or
attempts to limit costs, the CCI should revisit them before any
implementation begins.
At a minimum, the public should be given access to the specific
copyright interpretations adopted by the CCI; copyright owners should
not be permitted to generate infringement notices based on detection
technology found to be fundamentally unreliable; the grounds for
subscriber appeals from mitigation measures should be expanded to
encompass more categories of lawful activity; neutrals conducting
Independent Reviews should be informed whether the copyright owner
in question has a pattern of false accusations; decisions resulting from
Independent Reviews should include written explanations; and those
decisions should be published.
At a more systemic level, the Advisory Board should be given a
more active role in CCI governance and in the selection of expert
consultants. Because the signatory copyright owners and ISPs are not
sufficiently adversarial to guarantee protection of consumer interests,
the expertise and diverse perspectives of the Advisory Board are sorely
needed.
What a single ISP might undertake on its own becomes a greater
concern when undertaken collusively. By acting collectively, and
thereby limiting consumer choice, the CCI members take on a greater
responsibility to acknowledge the legitimate concerns of their
customers. Whatever educational value might be inherent in the
Copyright Alert program will be lost so long as it remains hidden inside
the black box.
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